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Reflections on Educating Latino and Latina 
Undocumented Children:  Beyond Plyler v. Doe 
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INTRODUCTION 
The struggle for educational fairness and opportunity for Latino 
and Latina children continues even amidst the anti-immigrant 
campaigns currently raging against noncitizens1 in the United States.  
Census 20002 highlighted the reality of the increased number of 
noncitizens in the country, particularly Latinos, and has precipitated 
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 1 The term “noncitizen” is used in this Article instead of the term “alien,” which 
is the Immigration and Naturalization Act term used to denote those who are not 
United States citizens.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2004).  Immigration law 
commentators have noted that the term alien is a pejorative term that has 
connotations of otherness or lack of humanity.  See Kevin Johnson, “Aliens” and the 
U.S. Immigration Laws:  The Social and Legal Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI 
INTER-AM. L. REV. 263, 268 (1997); Victor Romero, On Elián and Aliens:  A Political 
Solution to the Plenary Power Problem, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 343, 343 (2000-
2001); see also Gerald Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws:  Government Services, Proposition 187, 
and the Structure of Equal Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1441 (1995); Peter 
Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1984).  For a 
discussion of the anti-immigrant sentiment in the country see IMMIGRANTS OUT!:  THE 
NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES (Juan F. Perea 
ed., 1997). 
 2 See Michael E. Fix & Jeffrey S. Passel, U.S. Immigration at the Beginning of the 21st 
Century, available at The Urban Institute, 
http://www.urban.org/Template.cfm?Section=Home&NavMenuID=75&template=/
TaggedContent/ViewPublication.cfm&PublicationID=7321(Aug. 2, 2001) (stating in 
testimony before the House Judiciary Committee that Census 2000 numbers show 
increased immigration levels). 
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a renewal of nationwide concern over an “immigration crisis.”3  This 
perceived crisis has given rise to myriad new restrictions on the 
participation of noncitizens in United States society. 
In recent years, both the states and the federal government have 
placed restrictions upon the civic participation of noncitizens in 
virtually all areas of the United States’ societal landscape.  These new 
restrictions on noncitizens, which have sparked a new civil rights 
movement—a so-called Immigrant’s Rights Movement4—touch areas 
as varied as driver’s licensing,5 workplace protections,6 access to 
health care,7 welfare benefits,8 and education,9 among others. 
From the dismantling of bilingual education through voter 
initiatives in California,10 Arizona,11 and Massachusetts,12 to the 
 
 3 See Linda Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference that Alienage Makes, 69 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047 (1994) (describing emergent concern in the United States over a 
perceived immigration crisis). 
 4 The Immigrant Workers Freedom Ride, which took place in October 2003, is 
an example of the linkage of the Civil Rights movement to the Immigrant Rights 
movement.  See Steven Greenhouse, Immigrants Rally in City, Seeking Rights, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 5, 2003 at A1 (discussing Immigrant Workers Freedom Ride campaign, in which 
eighteen buses carrying nine hundred immigrants from ten cities traveled over two 
weeks across the United States to Washington, D.C. and New York in an effort to 
raise consciousness for the rights of immigrants); AFL-CIO, The Struggle for Immigrant 
Workers’ Rights Is a Fight for Civil Rights, at 
http://www.aflcio.org/issuespolitics/immigration/civil_rights.cfm (last visited Apr. 
18, 2005). 
 5 See María Pabón López, More Than a License to Drive:  State Restrictions on the Use 
of Driver’s Licenses by Noncitizens, 29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 89 (2004) (discussing efforts to 
restrict state driver’s license issuance to noncitizens). 
 6 See Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 149 (2002) (holding 
that undocumented worker not entitled to backpay, although employer engaged in 
unfair labor practice). 
 7 See Undocumented Alien Emergency Medical Assistance Amendments of 2004, 
H.R. 3722, 108th Cong. (2004).  This bill, introduced by California Congressman 
Dana Rohrbacher on January 21, 2004, would have mandated that hospitals verify 
their patients’ citizenship status and turn over those who were undocumented to the 
Department of Homeland Security.  The bill was later defeated.  See National 
Immigration Law Center, Bill Requiring Hospitals to Report Undocumented Persons 
Defeated, 
18 IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS UPDATE, No. 4 (June 18, 2004), at 
http://www.nilc.org/immspbs/health/health028.htm. 
 8 See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 
tit. IV, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1601–46 (2005)) 
(“Restricting Welfare and Public Benefits for Aliens”). 
 9 See infra Part IV. 
 10 Bilingual education was dismantled in California in 1998, following the passage 
of Proposition 227.  See Kevin Johnson & George Martinez, Discrimination by Proxy:  
The Case of Proposition 227 and the Ban on Bilingual Education, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1227, 1227 (2000).  The proposition passed “by a sixty-one to thirty-nine percent 
margin.”  Id. 
 11 Arizona voters approved Proposition 203 in 2000.  See Elizabeth Becker et al., 
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attempted denial of education to undocumented children 
perpetrated in the 1990s in California’s Proposition 187,13 Latino 
children are suffering disproportionately in the culture war in our 
midst.  It is my contention that these children, and in particular the 
undocumented ones, are caught in the middle of this war against 
noncitizens.14  Undocumented children who, as the Supreme Court 
recognized, are blameless and present in this country through no 
fault of their own,15 have been unwillingly thrust into this unwelcome 
role. 
This recent phenomenon in our polity has developed despite 
the Supreme Court’s Plyler v. Doe16 decision.  Simply put, the Plyler 
Court held that undocumented children are entitled to a state-
funded primary and secondary education.17  Yet Latino 
undocumented students remain hostages in the “immigration crisis” 
siege, notwithstanding Plyler’s guarantee of a free public education 
and the promise of educational equality rooted in two earlier 
Mexican-American school desegregation cases.18 
 
The 2000 Elections:  State by State; West, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2000, at B17 (noting that 
Proposition 203 passed in Arizona, a state where one in every eight students is not a 
native speaker of English); see also William Ryan, Note, The Unz Initiatives and the 
Abolition of Bilingual Education, 43 B.C. L. REV. 487, 487 (2002).  Proposition 203 is 
codified in title 15, sections 751–755 of the Arizona Revised Statutes. 
 12 Question 2 passed in Massachusetts by a 68% to 32% margin in 2002.  See 
Charu A. Chandrasekhar, The Bay State Buries Bilingualism:  Advocacy Lessons from 
Bilingual Education’s Recent Defeat in Massachusetts, 24 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 43, 43 
(2003). 
 13 See infra Part IV.B. 
 14 Indeed, language-minority students, most often noncitizens and many of them 
undocumented, have also fared poorly in the national immigration battles.  For 
example, the fact that in the midst of all the celebrations of the fiftieth anniversary of 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), no academic or media attention has 
been devoted to the fact that it is also the thirtieth anniversary of Lau v. Nichols, 414 
U.S. 563 (1974), the Supreme Court opinion that ushered in the era of bilingual 
education, is very telling in this regard. 
 15 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982). 
 16 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 17 Id. at 230. 
 18 The earliest recorded case in the struggle for equality in education for Latino 
students is Alvarez v. Owen, No. 66625 (Cal. Sup. Ct. San Diego County filed Apr. 17, 
1931), commonly known as the “Lemon Grove Incident.”  See Robert R. Alvarez, Jr., 
The Lemon Grove Incident:  The Nation’s First Successful Desegregation Court Case, 32 J. SAN 
DIEGO HIST. 116 (Spring 1986), available at 
http://sandiegohistory.org/journal/86spring/lemongrove.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 
2005).  The case took place in the 1930s in the community of Lemon Grove in San 
Diego County, California and was the nation’s first successful school desegregation 
case.  Id.  The community’s attempt to bar Mexican students from grammar school 
was unsuccessful, once a lower court ordered the admission of all Mexican students 
to the school and indicted school board members for illegal segregation.  Id.  The 
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These vulnerable students generally still face severe challenges 
to their educational prospects.  Thus, more than twenty years after 
Plyler, it is necessary to understand what has happened to the 
education of Latino undocumented children in the United States.  
What can we learn from Plyler and its aftermath?  What is the future 
of Plyler v. Doe?  Why is it that Plyler’s promise of educational equality 
has not reached its full potential?  And finally, what meaning does 
Plyler have in the current discussion of membership and exclusion in 
our society?  These are largely unanswered questions that no article 
can completely address.  In an attempt to shed some light on these 
murky questions, however, this Article explores the various aspects of 
the United States educational system and how the Latino 
undocumented student has fared post-Plyler. 
Part I of this Article examines the current situation of Latino 
undocumented students in an effort to understand the challenges 
facing both the students and the educational systems in which they 
are immersed.  Using census and other available data, Part I discusses 
the number of undocumented students currently in American 
schools and sets forth a picture of their educational status and 
attainment.  Also, this section provides a review of the challenges and 
obstacles standing in the way of educational achievement for Latino 
undocumented students, painting a portrait of their daily realities. 
In order to provide an understanding of the nuances of Plyler v. 
Doe, Part II closely examines the opinion and Part III explores its 
subsequent history.  Next, Part IV reviews the circumstances in which 
Plyler has come under attack and assesses the continued vitality of 
Plyler.  Finally, Part V offers an analysis of the two recent major 
affirmative action cases.  The aim of Part V is to examine the Court’s 
most recent pronouncements regarding equal protection as it 
pertains to education and those cases’ effects on the vitality of Plyler.  
In particular, Part V discusses access to higher education for the 
undocumented, using research of pending federal legislation and 
also by reviewing all fifty states’ laws regarding higher education for 
undocumented students. 
This Article will show that Plyler stands for the proposition that 
education, although not a fundamental right,19 is an integral aspect of 
membership in our community.  Thus, Plyler is still a vital opinion 
 
second Mexican-American desegregation case is Westminster School District v. Mendez, 
161 F.2d 774, 781 (9th Cir. 1947), in which the court found that the segregation of 
school children of Mexican descent was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
In this sense, Westminster may be viewed as a precursor to the landmark decision of 
Brown v. Board of Education. 
 19 See infra notes 87–95 and accompanying text. 
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even in the face of the current “immigration crisis” because Plyler 
stands for abolition of castes and an affirmation of equality—two 
precepts which should still be bedrock principles of the critical 
democratic moment in which we live. 
This Article argues, however, that these two propositions for 
which Plyler stands are dead letters in the face of the reality of the 
undocumented student.  The unwelcome but inescapable reality for 
undocumented students is that, without the prospect of normalizing 
their immigration status, the education they receive is useful 
individually for personal growth, but is of no consequence for the 
betterment of the overall condition of Latinos in the United States 
because the undocumented remain unable to participate in our 
democratic society.  In that sense, Plyler v. Doe may join Brown v. Board 
of Education20 as a decision embodying the interest convergence 
covenants in which educational opportunities for minority students 
exist only when the students’ interests and the nation’s interests 
converge.21  Analyzing Plyler under an interest convergence model 
demonstrates that the nation’s interest is the maintenance of an 
underclass of undocumented, low-wage earners who fuel the nation’s 
economy by performing work that is undesirable to many United 
States natives.  The continued existence of this underclass must be 
related to the limited educational attainment of those in the group, a 
result perpetuated by the lackluster effect of Plyler as a catalyst for 
further educational gains for Latino undocumented children.22 
I. THE STATUS OF LATINO AND UNDOCUMENTED STUDENTS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
A. `General Data Regarding Latino and Immigrant Students 
According to the latest census data, 10.5 million students in the 
United States are children of immigrants, and one-fourth of these 
students are foreign born.23  More than one-third of the children of 
 
 20 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 21 See DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS:  BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE 
UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 67 (2004). 
 22 Admittedly, this view may change over time with a greater acceptance by the 
United States populace of the undocumented worker.  As the number of retiring 
Americans increases, and there is a realization that the Social Security benefits 
available for them would be larger, or they could retire earlier with new entrants into 
the Social Security system who bring the fruits of their labor into the system, 
acceptance of undocumented workers may grow. 
 23 Michael E. Fix & Jeffrey S. Passel, U.S. Immigration:  Trends & Implications for 
Schools 4, available at Educational Resources Information Center, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 
http://www.eric.ed.gov/, document no. ED474609 (Urban Inst. Jan. 29, 2003). 
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immigrants24 hail from Mexico while one-fifth come from other Latin 
American countries.25 
The census data also show that there are over 11.4 million 
Latino children under the age of eighteen in the United States.26  
This number represents 16% of all the children in the United States, 
even though only 12% of the overall population is Latino.27  This 
population increased by approximately ten million between 1990 and 
2000, accounting for 38% of the United States’ population growth 
during that decade.28  Finally, the Census Bureau estimates that by the 
year 2050, Latinos in the United States will number ninety-eight 
million—more than three times their current number—representing 
about 25% of the total population.29 
B. Data on Undocumented Students in the United States 
Because of the nature of the lives of undocumented persons as 
being in the “shadows” of the United States population, there is no 
actual data regarding the number of undocumented persons in the 
country; only estimates are available.  It is also difficult to estimate the 
number of undocumented schoolchildren in the United States.30  
Undocumented parents are reluctant to come forward and identify 
themselves to census takers or benefit providers for fear of being 
reported to the authorities.  The latest estimates show that two out of 
every ten undocumented persons in the country are undocumented 
students.31  The federal government has recently addressed this 
concern.  “The Census Bureau is developing a research plan aimed at 
 
 24 The term “immigrant” is not used with its strict immigration law meaning for 
purposes of the data compilation cited above.  It instead includes the following 
immigration law categories: immigrants, non-immigrants, refugees, legal permanent 
residents and even certain naturalized citizens.  Id. at 11. 
 25 Id. at 7. 
 26 Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Status and Trends in the 
Education of Hispanics, available at 
http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid=2003008 (Apr. 15, 2003) 
[hereinafter Status and Trends]. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, 
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:  ILLEGAL ALIEN 
SCHOOLCHILDREN—ISSUES IN ESTIMATING STATE-BY-STATE COSTS, available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04733.pdf (June 2004) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. 
 31 Jeffrey S. Passel et al., Undocumented Immigrants:  Facts and Figures, available at 
Urban Institute, http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=1000587 (Jan. 12, 2004) (noting 
that undocumented students comprise 1.6 million of the approximately 9.3 million 
undocumented persons in the United States). 
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eventually developing new information on the population of illegal 
immigrants residing in the United States.”32  Thus, the information 
needed to more accurately determine the number of undocumented 
students in the country should be available in the near future. 
C. Data Regarding the Educational Attainment of Latino Students 
Recent data suggest that much of the increase in minority 
enrollment in elementary and secondary schools is attributable to 
Latinos.  Yet, they have higher drop-out rates and lower high school 
completion rates than African American or White-Anglo students.33  
In 2000, 39% of public school students at the K–12 levels were 
minorities.34  Of these, slightly less than half, or 44%, were Latino.35  
In terms of change over time, the overall percentage of minority 
students in public schools increased by 17% between 1972 and 2000.36  
Slightly more than 10% of the increase was attributable to Latinos, 
while the number of African American students increased by only 
2%.37  The drop-out rate for Latino students is 28% as compared with 
7% for White-Anglo students and 13% for African American 
students.38 
Even though there is a positive relationship between education 
and salary for all racial/ethnic groups in this country, data from a 
recent study suggest that incomes of Latino men are lower than those 
of Anglo men at most educational levels.39  Finally, aggregate national 
statistics document lower achievement levels for Latino immigrant 
students in several areas, including standardized testing.40 
 
 32 GAO REPORT, supra note 30, at 18. 
 33 Status and Trends, supra note 26. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id.  Specifically, in 2000, the median earnings of Hispanic men age twenty-five 
and older were $13,000 less than that of white men, while the median earnings of 
Hispanic women age twenty-five and older were $6500 less than that of white women.  
Id. 
 40 Bd. on Children & Families et al., Immigrant Children and Their Families:  Issues 
for Research and Policy, 5 CRITICAL ISSUES FOR CHILDREN & YOUTHS 72 (1995), available 
at 
http://www.futureofchildren.org/information2826/information_show.htm?doc_id=
71141 [hereinafter Immigrant Children]. 
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D. Data on Limited English Proficiency (“LEP”) Students in the 
United States 
Although the following figures are not restricted to 
undocumented or Latino children, they are worth reviewing because 
it is apparent that the current influx of new immigrant groups means 
continuing increases in the number of students who enter United 
States schools with little or no English proficiency.41  Between 1990 
and 2000, the overall LEP student population in the United States 
increased by more than half, from 14 million to 21.3 million.42 
Between 1980 and 2000, the number of children in the United 
States speaking a language other than English at home more than 
doubled, from 5.1 million to 10.6 million.43  The most recent census 
data show that two-thirds of all non-English-speaking families speak 
Spanish.44  The data further show that 2.6 million students are LEP, 
representing 5% of all students in United States schools.45  About 1.7 
million of these are United States natives.46  The Census Bureau also 
estimates that 1.8 million school-age children live in households in 
which no one age fourteen or older speaks English “very well.”47 
Studies have shown that noncitizen students are at serious risk 
for failure in the absence of bilingual education, as they are 
disproportionately represented among LEP students.48  The data have 
also shown that it is often the case that LEP affects school 
achievement.49 
E. Other Challenges Facing Undocumented and Latino Students 
1. Fear of Deportation 
Undocumented children also face challenges in terms of their 
mental and emotional health because of the added stress associated 
with the fear of deportation and separation from family members.50  
This fear of deportation, in particular, can extend all the way to the 
school gate.  For example, in Virginia, “[p]ublic employees in higher 
 
 41 Status and Trends, supra note 26. 
 42 Fix & Passel, supra note 23, at 11. 
 43 Id. at 20. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 22. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Immigrant Children, supra note 40. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
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education are encouraged to voluntarily disclose to the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service and to the Office of the Attorney General 
in Virginia factual information indicating that a student on campus is 
unlawfully present in the United States, or enrolled without proper 
authorization.”51 
 Fear of deportation also has its source in the fact that the 
federal government has invited local law enforcement agencies to 
enforce immigration laws, and the invitation has been accepted in 
some states and localities.52  For example, in Florida, state law 
enforcement entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with the 
federal government in 2002 whereby state law enforcement agents 
were trained by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), 
then worked under federal supervision and were able to enforce 
federal immigration law.53  Thus, deportation for the undocumented 
student may only be as far away as a call to the local police for any 
infraction of state law. 
2. Migrant Students’ Concerns 
In addition, there is another segment of the Latino 
undocumented student population—the children of migrants—that 
faces severe challenges.  Migrant students travel seasonally with their 
parents and families, following the various crop harvests that provide 
them seasonal employment from state to state.  These students 
experience daunting obstacles on a routine basis.  Their parents 
 
 51 Memorandum from Alison P. Landry, Assistant Attorney General, to 
Presidents, Chancellor, Rectors, Registrars, Admissions Directors, Domicile Officers 
and Foreign Student Advisors (INS Designated School Officials) and the Executive 
Director of the State Council for Higher Education in Virginia (Sept. 5, 2002), 
available at http://www.steinreport.com/va_colleges_11152002.htm. 
 52 The invitation of local sheriffs, highway patrols, and police agencies to enforce 
immigration law raises Tenth Amendment federalism issues under New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). At least one immigration scholar has concluded that the 
form in which the federal government has obtained the cooperation of local law 
enforcement, through an invitation, rather than a mandate, avoids Tenth 
Amendment concerns.  See Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority 
Position:  Why Inviting Local Law Enforcement to Enforce Immigration Law Violates the 
Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 965, 975–76 (2004). 
 53 Id. at 970–71 (citing Memorandum of Understanding Between the INS and the 
State of Florida (July 26, 2002), reprinted in 79 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1138, app. II, at 
1120 (2002)).  For a recent example of another locality entering into an agreement 
with the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Bureau of the Department of 
Homeland Security, see Press Release No. SHB-17A-05, Los Angeles Sheriff’s Office, 
Homeland Security Under Secretary Asa Hutchinson Announces Memorandum of 
Understanding with Los Angeles County:  MOU Provides for Immigration 
Enforcement Training for LA Sheriff’s Department’s Custody Employees (Feb. 24, 
2005) (copy on file with author). 
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enroll them in school, then withdraw them as soon as they have to 
leave in their quest for work.  The students are enrolled again in their 
new schools once they arrive at their next destination.54  For example, 
the academic transcript of a migrant student shows “grading periods 
for the same 7 high schools, for the same 4 weeks over each of 4 
years.”55 
In addition to the constant geographic displacement and the 
educational disadvantages that may ensue from this lifestyle, migrant 
students, who number nearly 800,000 in the United States, face other 
obstacles in their daily lives, including severe poverty, inadequate 
housing, and “the stigma of being a migrant.”56  These are severe 
obstacles to educational achievement, regardless of immigration 
status. 
3. Resegregation and Inadequate Financing 
Due to housing segregation patterns, the United States is 
currently undergoing educational resegregation.57  Supreme Court 
decisions limiting school desegregation and authorizing a return to 
neighborhood schools have been seen as precursors to resegregation 
in the United States.58  In particular, Latinos are disproportionately 
affected because of the rise of predominantly Latino neighborhood 
schools after busing was discontinued.59  In fact, data cited by the 
 
 54 See Cinthia Salinas & Maria E. Franquiz, Making Migrant Children and Migrant 
Education Visible, in SCHOLARS IN THE FIELD:  THE CHALLENGES OF MIGRANT EDUCATION 
xi (Cinthia Salinas & Maria E. Franquiz eds., 2003). 
 55 Michael A. Olivas, Storytelling Out of School:  Undocumented College Residency, Race, 
and Reaction, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1019, 1081 (1995). 
 56 Id.; cf. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982) (remarking on the stigma of 
illiteracy, which the Supreme Court stated would mark the undocumented students 
for their lifetimes). 
 57 The 2000 Census data showed increasing residential segregation for Latinos in 
almost all parts of the country.  This, along with migration, explains much of the 
increased segregation in schools.  See Gary Orfield & Chungmei Lee, Brown at 50:  
King’s Dream or Plessy’s Nightmare, at 
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/reseg04/resegregation04.php 
(Jan. 2004); see also Erica Frankenberg et al., A Multiracial Society with Segregated 
Schools:  Are We Losing the Dream, at 
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/reseg03/resegregation03.php 
(Jan. 2003) (describing patterns of resegregation in the United States in the last 
twelve years). 
 58 Id.; see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 
467 (1992); Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Schs. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991).  See 
generally Joseph R. McKinney, Commentary, The Courts and White Flight:  Is Segregation 
or Desegregation the Culprit?, 110 EDUC. L. REP. 915 (1996). 
 59 See, e.g., Keyes v. Cong. of Hispanic Educators, 902 F. Supp. 1274 (D. Colo. 
1995).  In Colorado, for example, in 1991, only 1% of Latino students were in 
intensely segregated minority schools (more than 90% minority enrollment), while 
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Supreme Court for the year 2000–2001 show that 76.3% of Latino 
children attend schools where “minorities made up a majority of the 
student body.”60  Increased segregation of Latino students is most 
apparent in the western part of the country, where 80% of Latino 
students attend predominately minority schools—schools with 50–
100% minority enrollment.61  Between 1968 and 2001, the percentage 
of Latino students in intensely segregated schools—schools with 90–
100% minority enrollment—more than tripled from 12% to 37%.62  
Thus, Latino undocumented students who live in urban areas are 
likely experiencing the resegregation of United States public schools 
and the concomitant ill effects of this phenomenon,63 including high 
drop-out rates, less-qualified teachers, and fewer educational 
opportunities.64  
 Another challenge for the Latino undocumented student is one 
that faces many urban minority students in the United States.  As a 
result of San Antonio v. Rodriguez,65  school districts are not required to 
have equal financing throughout a state.  In fact, after Rodriguez, 
school-finance equity concerns must be challenged via state 
constitutional provisions.  If a state constitution does not specifically 
address educational equity in school financing, those challenging 
unequal school financing will probably be left without any recourse. 
Furthermore, because school districts are mostly funded by 
property taxes, poorer areas with lower property values and lower 
property taxes result in school districts with inadequate finances, 
limiting their ability to fulfill their educational mission.  In Rodriguez, 
the Supreme Court countenanced a school-financing scheme that 
relied on property taxes in the face of an equal protection challenge.  
Applying the rational basis standard of review,66 the Court held that 
such a system did provide for a basic school education, bearing a 
rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.67  In line with 
 
in 2001, 17% of Latino students were in intensely segregated minority schools.  See 
Orfield and Lee, supra note 57, at 28. 
 60 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 345 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing 
Frankenberg et al., supra note 57, at 28 fig. 4). 
 61 Frankenberg et al. supra note 57, at 80 table 37; Orfield & Lee, supra note 57, 
at 20 & 21 table 9. 
 62 Id. at 20. 
 63 GARY ORFIELD ET AL., DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION 65–67 (1996). 
 64 Id. 
 65 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 66 The use of this standard was in part adopted based on the holding that 
education is not a fundamental right.  See id. at 29–30, 37–38, 40, 44. 
 67 Id. at 54–55.  This result is precisely the opposite of what had been found by 
the California Supreme Court in Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d. 1241 (Cal. 1971), a 
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Rodriguez, minority students disproportionately reside in poorer 
school districts where they generally perform below average on 
standardized tests and where, in fact, schools are most expensive to 
operate.68  The presence of Latinos among the minorities in this 
group69 is clearly apt to include undocumented students. 
4. Higher Risk Factors for Latino Students in Higher 
Education 
A recently published longitudinal study of 15,000 eighth-grade 
students in the United States shows that, on average, Latinos are 
overrepresented with respect to higher education risk factors.  Such 
figures show how unprepared these students are for postsecondary 
education.70  In particular, the study found Latinos are 
overrepresented in the following risk areas: having parents without a 
high school degree (“educational legacy”); having a low family 
income; having siblings who have dropped out of school; being held 
back in school; having a C or lower grade point average; changing 
schools; and having children while still in high school.71  The report 
concludes that: 
At almost every level . . . Latino youth face an upward struggle.  
The impact of these forces is to suppress the educational 
opportunity for these youth and lead them to a future that 
requires more effort to keep on current standing with other 
students, much less than trying to climb up the ladder of 
opportunity.72 
 
decision in which the California school funding system was found in violation of the 
state and federal equal protection clauses. 
 68 See James E. Ryan, The Influence of Race in School Finance Reform, 98 MICH. L. REV. 
432, 435 (1999). 
 69 Id. 
 70 Watson Scott Swail et al., Latino Youth and the Pathway to College vii, available at 
http://www.educationalpolicy.org (June 2004).  The higher risk factors faced by 
Latinos in higher education were brought to the attention of the Supreme Court in 
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 234 (2003).  See Brief of Latino Organizations as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Respondents, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 234 (U.S. 2003) (No. 
02-516), available at 2003 WL 536740. 
 71 Swail, supra note 70, at 28. 
 72 Id. at 32. 
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II. PLYLER V. DOE:  A CLOSER LOOK AT A LANDMARK DECISION 
A. Applicability of the Equal Protection Clause to the Undocumented 
and the Standard of Review Applied:  Highlights of the Majority 
Opinion 
Plyler v. Doe73 is the leading case regarding the education of 
Latino undocumented students in the United States.  It stands among 
a pantheon of landmark educational cases, such as Brown v. Board of 
Education74 and Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.75  Yet it is 
far from just a historical opinion.  Indeed, Plyler is a vital opinion 
because of the nation’s economic interest regarding the availability of 
the noncitizen work force.76  A closer examination of the case will 
afford an opportunity to examine the message the Court sent 
regarding membership and equality, one that should resonate even 
to this day. 
Plyler is a groundbreaking case in that, for the first time, the 
Supreme Court clearly stated that undocumented persons are 
protected under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.77  Earlier cases had established that undocumented 
noncitizens are persons entitled to protection under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.78 
The Plyler Court arrived at this conclusion by stating that 
“whatever his status under the immigration laws, an alien is surely a 
‘person’ in any ordinary sense of that term.”79  The Court did so, 
building upon established precedent that aliens are “guaranteed due 
 
 73 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 74 347 U.S 483 (1954); see also Kevin Johnson, Civil Rights and Immigration:  
Challenges for the Latino Community in the Twentieth Century, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 42, 44 
(discussing Plyler as a high-water mark for Latinos before the Supreme Court and 
comparing it to Brown). 
 75 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 76 See, e.g., Halle Butler, Note, Educated in the Classroom or on the Streets:  The Fate of 
Illegal Immigrant Children in the United States, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1473, 1490–91 (1997) 
(discussing data regarding the contributions of noncitizens to the United States 
economy).  Even President Bush has recognized “a basic fact of life and economics: 
some of the jobs being generated in America’s growing economy are jobs American 
citizens are not filling.”  Press Release, President Bush Proposes New Temporary 
Worker Program (Jan. 7, 2004), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040107-3.html. 
 77 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 213; see also Michael A. Olivas, IIRIRA, The DREAM Act, and 
Undocumented College Student Residency, 30 J.C. & U.L. 435, 443 (2004) (discussing how 
“[p]rior to Plyler, the Supreme Court had never taken up the question of whether 
undocumented aliens could seek Fourteenth Amendment equal protections”). 
 78 See Olivas, supra note 77, at 443. 
 79 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 210. 
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process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”80  This 
principle had been established in 1886 in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,81 where 
the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal 
protection of the laws was “universal in [its] application, to all 
persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any 
differences of race, of color, or of nationality.”82  In Plyler, the Court 
reaffirmed Yick Wo and extended the reach of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause to the undocumented.83  The 
Court took this step because, under the Fourteenth Amendment, it is 
“persons” within the state’s jurisdiction that are to be protected from 
the denial of equal protection.  Thus, the Amendment’s protections 
would apply to those within a state’s borders, even if they are 
unlawfully present.84 
A notable aspect of the opinion with regard to the applicability 
of the Equal Protection Clause to the undocumented is the Court’s 
inquiry into the congressional debate surrounding the passage of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  In particular, the Court cited the following 
language from the debate recorded in the early legislative history of 
the Amendment:  “‘Is it not essential to the unity of the Government 
and the unity of the people that all persons, whether citizens or strangers, 
within this land, shall have equal protection in every State in this 
Union in the rights of life and liberty and property?’”85  In other 
words, the Court used the early legislative history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to buttress its ruling that the Equal Protection Clause 
applied to the undocumented plaintiffs in the case. 
Once the Court had determined the applicability of the Equal 
Protection Clause to the undocumented, its next task was to decide 
which level of scrutiny to apply to the governmental classification.  In 
determining whether a statute passes constitutional muster under the 
Equal Protection Clause, the decision regarding which level of 
scrutiny to apply is paramount.  Indeed, the level of scrutiny guides 
the Court’s analysis and determines not only how narrowly tailored to 
a state interest the challenged measure must be, but also how 
important the state interest must be in enacting the legislation. 
The Plyler Court found that strict scrutiny was inappropriate for 
two reasons.  First, in the Court’s view, undocumented noncitizens 
 
 80 Id. 
 81 118 U.S. 356 (1866). 
 82 Id. at 369. 
 83 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 212 n.10. 
 84 Id. at 210. 
 85 Id. at 214 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1090 (1866) (remarks of 
Rep. Bingham)). 
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are not a suspect class because their unlawful presence in the country 
in violation of federal law is not, in the Court’s words, a 
“constitutional irrelevancy.”86  The second reason why the Court 
rejected strict scrutiny was the existing precedent that education is 
not a fundamental right that would require a narrow tailoring of the 
legislation and a compelling state interest to justify its curtailment.87  
Thus, the Plyler Court reaffirmed the holding in San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriguez88—that education is not a 
fundamental right—despite Justice Marshall’s plea to overrule it.89 
It is clear that Justice Brennan, who dissented in Rodriguez yet 
wrote the majority opinion in Plyler, did not have the votes to overrule 
Rodriguez via Plyler and hold that education is a fundamental right.90  
In his Rodriguez dissent, Justice Brennan disagreed with the majority’s 
view that the only rights that may be deemed fundamental are those 
explicitly and implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution and instead 
stated that “‘fundamentality’ is . . . a function of the right’s 
importance in terms of the effectuation of those rights which are 
constitutionally guaranteed.”91 
In fact, in his Rodriguez dissent, Justice Brennan used the 
following language from Justice Marshall’s dissent in the same case:  
“‘As the nexus between the specific constitutional guarantee and the 
nonconstitutional interest draws closer, the nonconstitutional interest 
becomes more fundamental and the degree of judicial scrutiny 
applied when the interest is infringed on a discriminatory basis must 
 
 86 Id. at 223. 
 87 Id. (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28–39 (1973) 
(holding that education is not a fundamental right and that “a State need not justify 
by compelling necessity every variation in the manner in which education is provided 
to its population”)). 
 88 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 89 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230–31.  Article 28 of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child states that “Parties recognize the right of the child to an education.”  
Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, art. 28, 28 I.L.M. 1448, 1467, 
available at Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2005).  Subsection 
(a) of that article requires Parties to the Convention “make primary education 
compulsory and available free to all.”  Id. art. 28(a), 28 I.L.M. at 1467; see also Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 7, 2000, art. 14, 2000 O.J. (C 
364) 1, available at University of Minnesota Human Rights Library, 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/europeancharter2.html (stating that 
everyone has a right to education including the possibility of receiving a free 
compulsory education) (last visited Apr. 18, 2005). 
 90 See generally Mark Tushnet, Justice Lewis F. Powell and the Jurisprudence of Centrism, 
93 MICH. L. REV. 1854, 1862–74 (1995) (discussing the deliberations that took place 
during the drafting of the Plyler decision). 
 91 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 62 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
  
1388 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 35:1373 
be adjusted accordingly.’”92  As discussed below, Justice Brennan’s 
majority opinion in Plyler, a little more than a decade later, reflected 
this view.  Indeed, the Plyler Court applied what, in effect, amounts to 
a heightened, almost intermediate level of scrutiny, rather than a 
traditional rational basis standard.93 
Yet, the application of this heightened level of scrutiny to the 
denial of an education to undocumented children would not have 
been Justice Brennan’s predictable position based on his previous 
statement in the Rodriguez dissent.  There, the Justice asserted that 
education is “inextricably linked to the right to participate in the 
electoral process and to the rights of free speech and association 
guaranteed by the First Amendment.”94  Based on the close nexus 
between the constitutional guarantees of the First Amendment and 
the non-fundamental right to an education, Justice Brennan opined 
in his Rodriguez dissent that “any classification affecting education 
must be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.”95  This turned out not to 
be the case in Plyler, however, where Justice Brennan did not find 
education to be a fundamental right and thus did not apply strict 
scrutiny to a state law denying education to undocumented children. 
After the Court rejected the strict scrutiny standard in Plyler, it 
continued its equal protection analysis by applying a rational basis 
test to a Texas law that deprived undocumented children of a public 
education.  Yet, though the Court purported to apply the traditional 
rational basis test, a close reading of the opinion reveals that the 
Court actually employed a more demanding standard.96 
Application of a heightened rational basis test in Plyler began 
with the recognition that education is “‘perhaps the most important 
function of state and local governments.’”97  The Court then found 
that the state’s decision to deny an education to undocumented 
 
 92 Id. at 62–63 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 102–03 
(Marshall, J., dissenting)). 
 93 See infra notes 96–104 and accompanying text. 
 94 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 63 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 95 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 96 This application of heightened scrutiny under the rational basis standard of 
review seems stronger than traditional rational basis because under traditional 
rational basis the classification only needs to be rationally related to a legitimate 
government interest.  See Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the 
Supreme Court from the 1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 382 
(1999); see also Rachel F. Moran, Demography and Distrust:  The Latino Challenge to Civil 
Rights and Immigration Policy in the 1990s and Beyond, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 1, 14 (1995) 
(discussing Supreme Court’s application of  “rationality with a bite” standard). 
 97 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 222 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 
(1954)). 
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students could hardly be considered rational unless it furthered some 
substantial state goal.98  In assessing the rationality of the state statute, 
the Court warned that the cost to the nation and to the innocent 
children involved must be taken into account.99  The Court further 
stated that “it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected 
to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education”100 
and noted that because the state took it upon itself to provide an 
education to children, it had to be made “available to all on equal 
terms.”101 
The fact that it would be unfair to penalize the undocumented 
students for their parents’ illicit act was another concern for the 
Court.102  The Court found that undocumented children “can affect 
neither their parents’ conduct nor their own status.”103  Because the 
Texas law was directed towards children and imposed its 
discriminatory burden on the basis of a characteristic for which the 
children had no control, the Court found that there could not be a 
rational justification for penalizing the children for their presence in 
the country.104 
Furthermore, the Court was concerned about the creation of a 
permanent caste of undocumented resident aliens, which, in its view, 
could result because of their lack of education.105  The Court stated 
that “[l]egislation imposing special disabilities upon groups 
disfavored by virtue of circumstances beyond their control suggests 
the kind of ‘class or caste’ treatment that the Fourteenth Amendment 
was designed to abolish.”106  The Court recognized that depriving 
undocumented children of an education could result in the creation 
of a caste by imposing “a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of 
children not accountable for their disabling status.”107 
The Supreme Court expressed further concerns about the 
existence of this so-called “shadow population”—an undocumented 
underclass—allowed to remain in the United States by lax 
immigration enforcement and as a cheap labor source that need not 
be granted any of the benefits afforded to citizens or legally admitted 
 
 98 Id. at 224. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. at 223 (quoting Brown, 347 U.S. at 493). 
 101 Id. (quoting Brown, 347 U.S. at 493). 
 102 Id. at 220. 
 103 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220 (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977)). 
 104 See id. 
 105 Id. at 219. 
 106 Id. at 218 n.14. 
 107 Id. at 223. 
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noncitizens.108  In the Court’s view, the existence of this 
undocumented underclass “presents most difficult problems for a 
Nation that prides itself on adherence to principles of equality under 
the law.”109 
The Court next addressed the state’s argument that the goal of 
reducing state expenditures by denying a free public education to the 
children of the undocumented was a legitimate one.  The Court 
responded that there was no “evidence in the record suggesting that 
illegal entrants impose any significant burden on the State’s 
economy.”110  In fact, the district court had noted in Doe v. Plyler111 that 
“families of undocumented children contribute no less to the 
financing of local education than do citizens or legal residents of 
similar means.”112 
Additionally, the state’s singling out of undocumented children 
for denial of a free public education because “their unlawful 
presence within the United States renders them less likely than other 
children to remain within the boundaries of the State, and to put 
their education to productive social or political use within the State,” 
was similarly unpersuasive to the Court.113  Even though 
undocumented children would be subject to deportation, the Court 
found that many of them would remain in the country indefinitely, 
and some would even become lawful residents or United States 
citizens.114 
Finally, the Court concluded that “if the State is to deny a 
discrete group of innocent children the free public education that it 
offers to other children residing within its borders, that denial must 
be justified by a showing that it furthers some substantial state 
interest.”115  This formulation, of course, is a higher form of scrutiny 
than the traditional rational basis test, as discussed above.116  
Ultimately, because the state made no showing of a substantial state 
interest, the Court invalidated the Texas law. 
Thus, the Plyler Court contextualized the inequality inherent in 
the state’s denial of an education to undocumented children.  The 
 
 108 Id. at 219. 
 109 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 218–19. 
 110 Id. at 228. 
 111 458 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Tex. 1978). 
 112 Elizabeth Hull, Undocumented Aliens and the Equal Protection Clause:  An Analysis 
of Doe v. Plyler, 48 BROOK. L. REV. 43, 59 (1981); see also Plyler, 458 F. Supp. at 588–89. 
 113 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 229–30. 
 114 Id. at 230. 
 115 Id. 
 116 See supra notes 96–104 and accompanying text. 
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Court’s equal protection analysis resulted in its use of a rational basis 
level of scrutiny in theory, but not in practice.  Notwithstanding this 
contextualization and the Court’s sweeping language regarding the 
existence of an undocumented underclass, undocumented students 
have not been afforded rights without resistance, as discussed 
below.117 
B. Three Concurrences:  Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell 
Three members of the Court wrote concurrences in Plyler: 
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell.  Justice Marshall’s 
concurrence reaffirmed his view that “an individual’s interest in 
education is fundamental”118 and rejected the rigid two-tier approach 
in equal protection jurisprudence, calling instead for varying levels of 
scrutiny “depending upon the ‘constitutional and societal importance 
of the interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of 
the basis upon which the particular classification is drawn.’”119  Both 
assertions were reiterations of views that Justice Marshall had 
expressed in earlier dissents.120  But as discussed earlier, the Plyler 
majority tacitly employed a “sliding scale” approach to the standard 
of constitutional review in its equal protection analysis.121 
Justice Blackmun’s concurrence emphasized his view that “the 
nature of the interest at stake is crucial to the proper resolution” of 
the case and reaffirmed that, when analyzing whether a fundamental 
right exists for equal protection purposes, there are meaningful 
distinctions among the multitude of social and political interests 
regulated by the states.122  In Justice Blackmun’s view, “denial of an 
education is the analogue of denial of the right to vote: the former 
relegates the individual to second-class social status; the latter places 
him at a permanent political disadvantage.”123  The Justice also 
enunciated his conviction that the classification of undocumented 
children was not a “monolithic” one and that many of the students 
would remain in this country permanently.124 
Finally, Justice Powell wrote separately “to emphasize the unique 
 
 117 See infra Parts IV & V. 
 118 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 119 Id. at 231 (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99 
(1973)). 
 120 Id. 
 121 See supra note 96 and text accompanying notes 115–16. 
 122 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 231 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 123 Id. at 234 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 124 Id. at 236 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
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character” of the case.125  In Powell’s view, the undocumented 
children were being severely disadvantaged by factors such as the 
federal government’s inability to control the border and the 
attractiveness of jobs in the United States, and he agreed that they 
were victims who should not be left on the streets uneducated.126  
Justice Powell also opined that excluding the undocumented 
children “from a state-provided education is a type of punitive 
discrimination based on status that is impermissible under the Equal 
Protection Clause.”127 
It should be noted that Justice Powell played a key role in the 
evolution of the majority decision in Plyler.  In addition to drafting his 
concurrence, Justice Powell engaged in several written exchanges 
with Justice Brennan and requested that Justice Brennan share with 
him several versions of the draft opinion.128  Thus, it has been said 
that the ultimate result in Plyler became “almost nothing more than a 
direct reflection of [Powell’s] views of social policy.”129  In other 
words, because the Justice found the Texas statute problematic and 
misguided as a matter of social policy, he regarded it as 
unconstitutional.130  In fact, another effect of Justice Powell’s role in 
the evolution of the majority opinion is the dilution of the doctrinal 
arguments in the previous drafts, leaving it with “almost no 
generative or doctrinal significance because it invoked too many 
considerations.”131  This, of course, is one of the areas in which the 
dissent strongly criticized the majority opinion, as will be explored in 
Part II.C. 
C. Dissent:  The Beginning of the Attack on Plyler? 
The 5–4 decision in Plyler reveals a deeply divided court.  Chief 
Justice Burger’s dissent pointed out that the majority cobbled 
together a custom-made standard of review by “patching together bits 
and pieces of what might be termed a quasi-suspect class and quasi-
fundamental rights analysis, [and] . . . spin[ning] out a theory 
custom-tailored to the facts of these cases.”132  Justice Burger stated 
 
 125 Id. at 236 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 126 Id. at 237–38 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 127 Id. at 240 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 128 Tushnet, supra note 90, at 1866–73. 
 129 Id. at 1873. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 244 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).  The Plyler opinion was 
criticized at the time as “appear[ing] to be ad hoc and divorced from other related 
bodies of law created by the Court.”  Phillip B. Kurland & Dennis J. Hutchinson, The 
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that if “ever a court was guilty of an unabashedly result-oriented 
approach, this case [would be] a prime example.”133  The dissent 
further averred that, unpalatable though it may have seemed, the 
choice to enact legislation was a political one, and not a function of 
the Court.134  In Chief Justice Burger’s view, it is up to Congress, not 
to the Court, to “assess the social costs borne by our Nation when 
select groups are denied the means to absorb the values and skills 
upon which our social order rests.”135 
The dissent did not dispute that the denial of an education to 
this group of children would create a permanent caste of noncitizens.  
In fact the specter of this permanent caste was a “disturbing one;” yet 
it was Chief Justice Burger’s contention that this was “one segment of 
a larger problem” for the “political branches to solve.”136  Justice 
Burger further argued that the majority in Plyler “seeks to do 
Congress’ job for it,”137 and that it failed to allow the political process 
to run its course.138 
As with any deeply divided opinion of the Supreme Court, it is 
likely that such a vigorous dissent may have contributed to Plyler’s 
vulnerability to attack from both federal and state quarters.139  Also, in 
a sense, Chief Justice Burger’s words are prophetic in that the only 
recourse for undocumented children who have received an 
education and want to further pursue the American dream still lies in 
the political process.  Only by means of that process may the 
undocumented embark upon a path to legalization, and the ability to 
work legally and attend postsecondary educational institutions free of 
the obstacles they face today.140 
III. SUBSEQUENT HISTORY OF PLYLER:  UNDOCUMENTED TODAY, 
DOCUMENTED TOMORROW? 
The named plaintiffs in Plyler, which was a class action lawsuit, 
were sixteen Mexican children who could not establish that they had 
 
Business of the Supreme Court, O.T. 1982, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 628, 650 (1983).  Prof. 
Dennis J. Hutchinson has further asserted that “Plyler cut a remarkably messy path 
through other areas of the Court’s jurisprudence.”  Dennis J. Hutchinson, More 
Substantive Equal Protection?  A Note on Plyler v. Doe, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 167, 184. 
 133 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 244 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 134 Id. at 253–54. 
 135 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 136 Id. at 254. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id.  This argument, of course, could be considered by some a convenient and 
politically expedient solution. 
 139 See infra Part IV. 
 140 See infra Part V.B. 
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been legally admitted into the United States.141  The State argued that 
these children should be singled out because they were less likely to 
remain within the State and put their education to “productive social 
or political use within the State.”142  As noted, the Court dismissed this 
argument, asserting that no State has such a guarantee.143  The Court 
noted that “many of the undocumented children . . . will remain in 
this country indefinitely, and that some will become lawful residents 
or citizens.”144  According to available data, this prediction proved 
true not only for the vast majority of the Plyler plaintiffs, but for 
noncitizens in general.145 
The available citizenship data show that, of the noncitizens that 
arrived in the United States before 1970, 80.5% obtained citizenship 
by 2002.146  Furthermore, of those who entered the country between 
1970 and 1979, 66.6% had obtained citizenship by 2002 and 45% who 
entered between 1980 and 1989 had obtained citizenship.147  Finally, 
of those who entered in 1990 or later, 12.7% had obtained 
citizenship.148 
 What about the Plyler plaintiffs?  What has been their 
experience?  More than a decade after the opinion was issued, 
thirteen of the sixteen children were interviewed by journalists for a 
leading national newspaper.  The interviews disclosed that ten of 
them finished high school in Tyler, Texas.149  All of those interviewed 
are now legal residents and most of them have full-time 
employment.150  Although many have taken college courses, none has 
graduated from a four-year institution.151  They work as teacher’s 
aides, automobile mechanics, assembly-line workers, managers, 
painters, and stock clerks.152 Some work in the very school district that 
 
 141 See Plyler, 458 F. Supp. at 571 & n.1 (“Prior to the trial of this case on the 
merits, the court ordered that the action be maintained as a class action on behalf of 
all undocumented school-aged children of Mexican origin residing within the 
boundaries of the Tyler Independent School District.”). 
 142 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 229–30. 
 143 Id. at 230; see supra text accompanying notes 113–14. 
 144 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230. 
 145 See Paul Feldman, Texas Case Looms Over Prop. 187’s Legal Future, L.A. TIMES, 
Oct. 23, 1994, at A1; Dianne Schmidley, The Foreign-Born Population in the United 
States:  March 2002 (Feb. 2003), available at U.S. Census Bureau, 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p20-539.pdf (Feb. 2003). 
 146 Schmidley, supra note 145. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Feldman, supra note 145, at A1. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. 
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tried to bar them, and three are full-time housewives.153  Of the four 
families which these sixteen children comprised, only one has moved 
out of Tyler.154  Indeed, they appear to have attained the American 
dream by moving from undocumented to documented members of 
United States society. 
 The experience of the Plyler plaintiffs reflects the view of 
Professors Aleinikoff and Rumbaut, who have cited studies showing 
that, despite the fears of a multicultural nation underlying this 
“immigration crisis,” noncitizen acculturation within United States 
society is continuing its progress, as it has in the past.155  Thus, the 
available evidence to date show that the State’s argument in Plyler that 
the undocumented children would not put their education to use to 
benefit the state of Texas has proven to be false.  This evidence 
comports with the economists’ view of the social benefits of an 
education, which recognizes that education has a value to society 
beyond its value to the individual student.156 
Among these social benefits are “a more-educated and better-
informed electorate, lower rates of crime and violence, lower rates of 
poverty, better health and nutrition, and, generally a more smoothly 
functioning society.”157  These social benefits ensue regardless of 
immigration status because the undocumented person of today could 
indeed become the permanent resident or citizen of tomorrow. 
IV. PLYLER UNDER ATTACK 
As time has passed and Plyler has endured as precedent, it has 
not been immune from attack; there have been legislative efforts to 
overrule the decision.  In fact, the right to K–12 education for 
undocumented students has been under siege both at the federal and 
state levels as part of the current culture war against illegal 
immigration. 
A. Federal Proposals 
There were two federal proposals—in 1995 and 1996—that 
would have effectively overruled Plyler.158  These essentially identical 
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1396 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 35:1373 
proposals came at the time of the passage of the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”).159  The Gallegly 
amendments to the IIRIRA, sponsored by California’s Congressman 
Elton Gallegly, would have authorized “[s]tates to deny public 
education benefits to certain aliens not lawfully present in the United 
States.”160  The Gallegly amendments reflected the view that allowing 
undocumented students the opportunity to receive an education 
“promote[ed] violations of the immigration laws,”161 imposed 
“significant burden[s] on States’ economies and deplete[ed] states’ 
limited educational resources.”162  The proposed amendments also 
expressly permitted states to charge tuition fees to undocumented 
children.163  This, of course, was prohibited by Plyler as a denial of 
equal protection.164  The Gallegly amendments were not included in 
the final legislation.165  Opposition by Texas senators Kay Bailey 
Hutchison and Phil Gramm as well as an organized publicity 
campaign by a number of public interest groups contributed to the 
amendments’ defeat.166 
B. State Proposals:  California’s Proposition 187 
In California, following a very fractious and divisive campaign in 
which its proponents chanted “Save our State,” Proposition 187 
passed by a close vote on November 8, 1994.167  Once the ballot 
initiative passed, it became effective the next day.168  One of its key 
provisions, Section 7, contravened the mandate of Plyler in that it 
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 160 H.R. 4134. 
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denied undocumented children in the state a free public school 
education.169  This provision was judicially invalidated in League of 
United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson (“LULAC”).170 
The LULAC litigation was decided in two opinions.  Both the 
1995 and 1997 decisions explicitly reaffirmed Plyler.  In 1995, a 
district court in the Central District of California held that Section 7, 
which required the exclusion of undocumented students from public 
schools, was preempted by federal law under the Supremacy Clause,171 
based on the Supreme Court’s equal protection analysis in Plyler.172  In 
addition, in 1997, the court again followed Plyler, and noted also that 
Section 1643 of the California law expressly deferred to Plyler in 
providing that “[n]othing in this chapter may be construed as 
addressing alien eligibility for a basic public education as determined 
by the Supreme Court of the United States under Plyler v. Doe.”173 
 At the time of Proposition 187’s introduction and passage, 
opinions as to whether the Court would overrule or affirm Plyler via 
the LULAC litigation varied, but most commentators believed that 
LULAC would reach the Supreme Court and result in an overruling 
of Plyler.174  LULAC was not brought before the Supreme Court, 
however, and the parties dropped their appeals following an 
agreement to enter into dispute resolution regarding the issues raised 
in the appeal.175 
Although the federal proposal overruling Plyler did not pass and 
California’s Proposition 187 was invalidated in a judicial 
reaffirmation of Plyler, both of these instances serve as hallmarks of 
the culture wars surrounding the education of Latino undocumented 
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children.  What these attacks on Plyler reveal is a deep-seeded 
resentment towards undocumented immigrants, mostly due to the 
high cost that states bear when educating their children.  This was an 
argument, however, that the Court rejected in Plyler as an 
insufficiently rational basis for denying educational opportunities to 
undocumented children.176 
V. PLYLER’S CHALLENGE TO BRING ABOUT BROADER CHANGE FOR 
UNDOCUMENTED STUDENTS 
Much like Brown v. Board of Education, Plyler called for 
unprecedented reforms addressing the needs of marginalized youth 
and imposed duties on the states regarding their education.  
Although Plyler has certainly opened many doors for individual 
undocumented schoolchildren,177 it has not had the intense effect 
upon educational systems that Brown has had over the years.  In fact, 
it may be that Plyler acts as a form of preserving the undocumented as 
a separate class, ensuring a primary and secondary education for 
their children, but nothing more within society.  Does this mean that 
Plyler would not withstand attack if the issue of the education of the 
undocumented were to come before the Supreme Court again?  As 
discussed below, the Court’s latest pronouncements of equal 
protection in education suggest otherwise. 
A. Equal Protection:  Context Matters 
In the area of equal protection and education, we have seen the 
evolution from the school desegregation mandated in Brown, to 
affirmative action in higher education as a race-conscious remedy.  In 
two companion cases, Grutter v. Bollinger178 and Gratz v. Bollinger,179 the 
Supreme Court recently ruled that colleges may consider race as part 
of a narrowly tailored, race-conscious admissions plan.180  A race-
conscious admissions program that does not “‘unduly burden 
individuals who are not members of the favored racial and ethnic 
groups’” satisfies the narrow-tailoring requirement.181  Quotas or the 
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automatic award of points based on race, however, are 
impermissible.182  In the Court’s view, because the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects persons, not groups, classifications based on 
race are “‘in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore 
prohibited.’”183  The Court found that close judicial scrutiny is 
required to “‘ensure that the personal right to equal protection of the 
laws has not been infringed.’”184 
In Grutter, the Supreme Court recognized that “context matters” 
in an equal protection analysis.185  In the Court’s view, strict scrutiny 
provides a structure in which to examine the “importance and the 
sincerity of the reasons”186 set forth for the classification within each 
context.187  In this contextualization of equal protection doctrine, the 
Court has departed from its decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Pena.188  There, the Court did not give weight to the social context 
behind the benign racial classification aimed at remedying past 
discrimination, a sentiment echoed by Justice Scalia, who stated that 
“[i]n the eyes of government, we are just one race here.”189 
The opinions in Gratz and Grutter establish that any policy that 
treats one racial group differently than another must employ 
narrowly tailored measures that further a compelling governmental 
interest.190  The Court has indicated that a narrowly tailored policy 
will survive strict scrutiny, thereby leaving open the idea that if a state 
can show a compelling governmental interest in denying education 
to undocumented children, and the means of denial is narrowly 
tailored, it would be upheld under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  It is noteworthy, however, that the 
Supreme Court clarified that only an “‘exact connection between 
justification and classification’” will support the use of racial 
classifications.191  Plyler gives us a clue as to what a compelling 
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governmental interest might be in the area of education.  In holding 
that the school district’s policy was unconstitutional, the Court found 
that the district had failed to show that educating undocumented 
children imposed a substantial burden on the state, referring to 
almost negligible costs associated with the education of those 
children. 
Today, however, there are approximately 1.6 million 
undocumented students in the United States,192 and the once 
negligible costs are now in the billions.193  Yet, the context of 
inequality and the existence of an underclass of undocumented 
individuals still survives.  Presumably, that would be taken into 
account before the Court would consider overruling Plyler. 
B. Access to Higher Education for Undocumented Students:  Mixed 
Success 
Another area in which Plyler has faced challenges in creating 
educational opportunity is in postsecondary education for the 
undocumented.  Access to higher education is still an unattainable 
reality for undocumented students.  For undocumented students, the 
obstacles to access to higher education range from the denial of 
admission,194 to an inability to obtain student loans,195 to being 
charged nonresident tuition,196 all because of lack of legal 
immigration status.  The following two sections will detail the efforts 
being undertaken at the state and federal levels to ensure access to 
postsecondary education for undocumented Latino students in the 
United States. 
1. Federal Efforts:  Work in Progress 
At the federal level, there have been several proposals to allow 
undocumented students access to higher education.197  Most notably, 
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the DREAM Act would amend the IIRIRA and repeal 8 U.S.C. § 1623, 
which denies education benefits to undocumented students if a 
United States national would not be eligible for the same benefits, 
without regard to State residence.198 Also, under certain 
circumstances, the DREAM Act would allow adjustment to legal status 
for undocumented students who complete a college education.199  
Section 4 of the DREAM Act provides for the cancellation of the 
removal of an undocumented student who has been admitted to an 
institution of higher education or who has earned his or her high 
school diploma or GED.200  Under this provision, the student’s status 
would be adjusted to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence.201  The Student Adjustment Act of 2003 is the House 
companion bill to the Senate’s DREAM Act and also would permit 
states to determine residency requirements for higher education 
purposes.202  The House version also contains provisions for the 
adjustment of an undocumented student’s illegal status.203  Both bills 
were left pending at the end of the 108th Congress and are expected 
to be reintroduced in 2005. 
 The Supreme Court’s rationale in Plyler regarding the 
unfairness of penalizing undocumented children for their parents’ 
illegal acts,204 as well as the concern over the creation of a permanent 
caste of undocumented residents,205 would seem to be applicable to 
the undocumented student seeking access to higher education in this 
day and age.  Commentators have similarly suggested that public 
policy supports the desirability of federal activity in furtherance of 
providing higher education opportunities for undocumented 
students.206 
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2. State Efforts:  Activity in the Majority of the States 
Across the country, there has been action at the state level to 
allow access to higher education for undocumented students.  A 
recent examination of the laws of the fifty states on this topic 
discloses the following results.  Eight states—California, Illinois, 
Kansas, New York, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, and Washington—permit 
undocumented students to pay resident tuition rates.207  These states 
grant in-state tuition based not on residency but on the basis of 
graduation from a high school in that state.208  Twenty-one additional 
states have considered legislation allowing undocumented students to 
pay in-state tuition rates.  Most of these bills, however, never even 
made it to a vote or were postponed indefinitely in committees.209  
The remaining twenty-one states have not considered the issue at 
all.210 
Undocumented students seeking a higher education, however, 
have been dealt severe blows in recent litigation in two states.  In the 
first case, several undocumented students sued Virginia higher 
education institutions for failure to admit them under a state policy.211  
In Equal Access Education v. Merten,212 the plaintiffs, several 
undocumented students and one association, claimed that federal 
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immigration law preempted the denial of admission to Virginia 
institutions of higher education, and that such denial violated the 
Commerce and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution.213  The 
plaintiffs have found themselves on the losing side of all of the 
rulings in the case.  For instance, unlike Plyler, where the plaintiffs 
proceeded anonymously, the five undocumented students in Equal 
Access Education were not allowed to proceed anonymously.214  As a 
result, three of the individual plaintiffs were unable to continue in 
that role for fear of being deported.215  The next setback was a pretrial 
dismissal of a large part of the plaintiffs’ case.216  Finally, the 
undocumented students lost the case altogether when the remaining 
aspects of the case were dismissed after the court found that the 
universities were using the appropriate federal standards to identify 
the undocumented students.217  Thus, as Equal Access Education 
illustrates, the rights of the undocumented students in the higher 
education context have been left unprotected in what would appear 
to be the beginning of an erosion of Plyler’s promise of educational 
equality.218 
 More recently, a lawsuit has been filed on behalf of two dozen 
United States citizen students, or parents of students, who pay non-
resident tuition at Kansas universities.219  They are challenging the 
recently enacted Kansas law220 that offers in-state tuition to 
undocumented students who have graduated from and attended high 
school in Kansas for at least three years or have obtained their GED 
in Kansas.221 
The plaintiffs in the case allege that the Kansas law, H.B. 2145, 
violates § 505 of IIRIRA, which prohibits an illegal alien from 
receiving a benefit for which a United States citizen is ineligible.222  
Plaintiffs also assert that H.B. 2145 contravenes federal law in that it 
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creates distinct immigration classifications only operative in Kansas 
that are not based on federal standards used to determine who is a 
lawful resident in the United States.223  Plaintiffs also allege that 
implementation of H.B. 2145 will encourage and induce the 
“transport of aliens into and across the United States” in violation of 
federal immigration law.224  Finally, the plaintiffs allege that a law 
drawing a distinction on the basis of alienage must meet the 
requirements of the Equal Protection Clause under the heightened 
standard of review, and that, because these students will not be able 
to work once they are educated, the arguments regarding their 
contribution to the workforce are unpersuasive.225  This case is still 
pending.  If the court does not contextualize the equal protection 
claim and instead follows the Adarand model, there is a possibility 
that the plaintiffs will succeed. 
CONCLUSION:  THE CONTINUED VITALITY OF PLYLER 
It is my contention that the importance of the Plyler debate to 
the education of undocumented Latino children turns on whether, 
once educational achievements are obtained, the undocumented will 
be able to become productive members of United States society, an 
aim the Supreme Court embraced in Plyler.226  As Professor Victor 
Romero stated: 
[W]ithout a guarantee that an undocumented person can achieve 
lawful immigration status following graduation from college, such 
a person will always live under the double threat of being 
ineligible to lawfully hold a job and possible removal from the 
United States.  And, since immigration regulation is a federal 
power, state legislatures could not tie academic achievement or 
state residency to immigration status.  The power to change one’s 
immigration status rests solely on Congress’s shoulders.227 
In my view, the continued vitality of Plyler lies in the renewed call 
for immigration reform, so that once the undocumented student is 
educated in our country, he or she will have the opportunity to work 
legally in the United States.  The spirit and message of Plyler would 
have the undocumented student achieve a measure of educational 
parity, as education is the great equalizer.  To this extent, the 
undocumented may appear to have entered into the confines of 
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“post-national” citizenship, if not formal citizenship.228  Post-national 
citizenship could serve as a way in which the undocumented may 
assert their claims by virtue of their personhood, based on universal 
human rights, education being one of the basic human rights.229  Yet, 
the very endurance of Plyler as precedent may itself then perpetuate 
the “silent covenant”230 of the “shadow population”231 of the 
undocumented, who have the right to at least a secondary (high-
school) education, but are unable to work and become full members 
of our society, and thus are unable to achieve a sense of belonging in 
this country.  Because the nation’s interest in maintaining a cheap 
and expendable labor force has converged232 with the expectation of 
an education for undocumented children, Plyler survives to this day. 
That Plyler can be viewed as an interest convergence case is 
further evinced by the fact that it was decided at a time when the 
hiring of undocumented workers had not yet been outlawed by the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA),233 and thus, it still was 
considered to serve the nation’s interest to have undocumented 
workers and their families in the country.  I contend that providing 
the children of undocumented workers a free public education 
would still be to the nation’s benefit, as in fact Justice Powell noted 
when he stated that education may be one of the reasons for the 
undocumented to come to the United States.234 
Viewing Plyler v. Doe in this light, and assessing the current 
situation of undocumented students in the United States, it is 
apparent that their educational advancement will occur when there is 
a convergence between the nation’s interest in allowing the 
normalization of their immigration status and the nation’s need for 
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the work that the undocumented perform.  “After almost two decades 
of anti-immigrant legislation, President Bush has finally announced a 
proposal to allow temporary guestworker status to undocumented 
workers under certain conditions.235  If the guestworker proposal 
announced by the President is any indication, it may be that such 
interests are about to converge. 
 
 
 235 See Press Release, President Bush Proposes New Temporary Worker Program, 
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